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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(f), since it involves an appeal from a court of record in a criminal case not
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The Defendant/Appellant, who entered guilty pleas to FORGERY, a third-degree felony, and
ATTEMPTED UNLAWFUL USE OF A CREDIT CARD, a class A misdemeanor, and who did not
timely move to withdraw his guilty plea, initially sought in this appeal to have his case remanded
to determine the validity of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, but the Appellant opposed
the motion to remand, and this Court denied the motion and dismissed the appeal with respect to
claims for ineffective assistance of counsel and any challenge to the validity of his guilty plea. See
Addendum Exhibit A (This Court's March 25,2004 Memorandum Decision issued in this case; State
v. Bang, 2004 UT App 79).
The only remaining issue asserted by the Defendant/Appellant is as follows:
Whether the District Court committed plain error in ordering that the Defendant pay
restitution in the amount of $2,300. See Record at p. 65-68 (Judgment, Commitment and Sentence),
Addendum Exhibit B.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Terms of sentences in criminal cases are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Houk,
906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995). The standard for determining whether plain error occurred is
as follows: to determine that plain error occurred, the appellate court must find that (i) an error
occurred; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
1

absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. See,
e.g., State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
The issue was not preserved by the Defendant or his counsel at sentencing, thus in order to
reverse and/or remand, this Court would have to find that plain error occurred, as discussed above.
See id.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-203 provides the criteria for determining restitution. See
Addendum Exhibit C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant/Appellant entered guilty pleas to FORGERY, a third-degree felony, and
ATTEMPTED UNLAWFUL USE OF A CREDIT CARD, a class A misdemeanor. See Record at
p. 50-56. His conviction was entered and he was sentenced. See Record at p. 65-68 (Judgment,
Commitment and Sentence), Addendum Exhibit B.
The Defendant/Appellant then filed this appeal. See Record at p. 69-70 (Notice of Appeal).
He initially sought in this appeal to have his case remanded to determine the validity of his claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel, but the Appellant opposed the motion to remand, and this Court
denied the motion and dismissed the appeal with respect to claims for ineffective assistance of
counsel and any challenge to the validity of his guilty plea. See Addendum Exhibit A (Memorandum
Decision).
This Court, however, did not dismiss the portion of Defendant/Appellant's appeal
challenging the restitution ordered in his sentence. See id.
2

In the sentencing phase of the proceedings below, a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report
("PSI") was prepared and considered by the District Court at the sentencing hearing. See Record at
p. 61 (PSI) (not included in Addendum because it was sealed); see also Record at p. 73 (hearing
transcript pages 16-24).
The PSI recommended the District Court order the Defendant to pay $2,300 restitution, and
the District Court did so, without objection from the Defendant or his counsel at the sentencing
hearing. See id.
The PSI asserts that the $2,300 restitution amount reflected merchandise the Defendant
illegally obtained from the merchant victim in the case. See Record at p. 61 (PSI pages 5-6).
However, the PSI concedes that the merchandise was confiscated from the Defendant by the police.
See id. (PSI page 3). The PSI does indicates that although the merchandise was confiscated by the
police, the victim had not yet received it back from the police and that the condition of the
merchandise was unknown. See id. (PSI pages 5-6).
Despite the fact the merchandise was confiscated and held by police to be returned to the
victim, the Court ordered restitution in the amount of $2,300 for the merchandise. See Record at p.
65-68 (Judgment, Commitment and Sentence at p. 2), Addendum Exhibit B.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The District Court committed plain error in ordering restitution for the value of the
merchandise at issue, when that merchandise was not lost, but was rather confiscated from the
Defendant/Appellant when he was arrested, and simply had not yet been returned to the victim by
the police, who were holding it in evidence at the time of the sentencing hearing.

3

ARGUMENTS
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 provides that the District Court shall, when determine the
monetary sum for restitution to be included in sentences for criminal offenses, consider the value of
the victim's property which was lost or destroyed. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4)(b)(i).
The property in question in this case, as explained in the PSI, was not lost or destroyed, but
was rather confiscated from the Defendant/Appellant when he was arrested, and simply had not yet
been returned to the victim by the police, who were holding it in evidence at the time of the
sentencing hearing.
It was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to order restitution in the amount of the
value of that merchandise, since it was not clearly lost or destroyed.
While neither the Defendant nor his counsel raised this issue at the sentencing hearing, the
Defendant is entitled to raise this issue here on appeal for the first time, since it constitutes plain
error. The standard for determining whether plain error occurred is as follows: to determine that
plain error occurred, the appellate court must find that (i) an error occurred; (ii) the error should have
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). As set forth above, since the merchandise at issue was not lost or
destroyed, it is clear that an error occurred in setting the restitution at $2,300. Since the status of the
merchandise was clearly set forth in the PSI, the error should have been obvious to the trial court.
This error was harmful, in that it resulted in a restitution order based on the value of merchandise
which was recovered rather than lost or destroyed.

4

CONCLUSION
The Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the restitution order
in the Judgment, Commitment and Sentence, and either order that no restitution is owed by this
Defendant/Appellant, or remand for consideration of the proper amount of restitution in this case.
Dated this g G ^

day of

n

Ma^

20 o ^

,

Randall C. Allen
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM
A. Memorandum Decision issued in this case by this Court on March 25, 2004
B. Judgment, Commitment and Sentence
C. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-203

EXHIBIT A

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAR 2 5 2004
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo
State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20030544-CA
F I L E D
(March 2 5 , 2004)

Mario D. King,
Defendant and Appellant.

2 0 0 4 UT App 79

Fifth District, Cedar City Department
The Honorable J. Philip Eves
Attorneys:

Randall C. Allen, Cedar City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Thorne.
PER CURIAM:
Mario D. King appeals his conviction and sentence for
Forgery, a third degree felony, and Attempted Unlawful Use of a
Credit Card, a class A misdemeanor. This appeal is before the
court on King's motion for a remand pursuant to rule 23B of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and on the State's motion for
partial dismissal of the appeal.
King did not file a timely motion to withdraw his guilty
pleas; nevertheless, he seeks to challenge the validity of the
pleas on appeal, contending that his trial counsel was
ineffective in advising him. The claim is, in substance, that
his pleas were not knowing and voluntary when entered.
Failure to file a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea
"extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the validity of
the guilty plea on appeal," State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,^3, 40
P.3d 630, including any right to challenge the guilty plea on the
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Melo,
2001 UT App 392,H1f7-8, 40 P. 3d 646. Because King failed to file
a timely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, this court lacks
jurisdiction to consider the claim that his guilty plea was not
voluntary as a result of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

King also failed to respond to the State's motion for partial
dismissal. Finally, the rule 23B motion seeks a remand to enter
findings of fact only on a claim that counsel was ineffective in
representing King in connection with his guilty pleas. 1
Accordingly, because we dismiss appeal to the extent that it
challenges the validity of the guilty pleas, we must also deny
the rule 23B motion.
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction only insofar
as it raises issues challenging the validity of the guilty plea.
The appeal shall continue as to the remaining issues related to
sentencing.

_^A^tA^
idith M. Billings,
Presiding Judge

Norman R. Jackson",

^ *7Z..-.Q,
William A. Thorne Jr., ''Judge

1. Even if the merits of the motion were considered, it does not
satisfy rule 23B's requirement to allege a nonspeculative
allegation of facts and instead makes conclusory allegations that
King seeks to support on remand. See Utah R. App. P. 23B(a);
State v. Johnson, 2000 UT App 290,^7, 13 P.3d 175.

20030544-CA
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of March, 2004, a true and
correct copy of the attached DECISION was deposited in the United
States mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be
delivered to:
RANDALL C. ALLEN
JENSEN GRAFF & BARNES LLP
250 S MAIN ST
PO BOX 726
CEDAR CITY UT 84720
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JEANNE B. INOUYE
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
HONORABLE J. PHILIP EVES
FIFTH DISTRICT, CEDAR CITY
CEDAR CITY HALL OF JUSTICE
40 N 100 E
CEDAR CITY UT 84720

Judicial Secretary

^^"^

TRIAL COURT: FIFTH DISTRICT, CEDAR CITY, 021501005
APPEALS CASE NO.: 20030544-CA

EXHIBIT B

TROY A. LITTLE (#9061)
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney
97 North Main, Suite #1
P.O. Box 428
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (435) 586-6694
Telecopier: (435) 586-2737

JUN
5th DISTRICT COURT
IRON COUNTY
. Depuiv Cieri

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT and
SENTENCE

Plaintiff,
Criminal No. 021501005
vs.
Judge J. Philip Eves
MARIO KING,
d.o.b. 11/19/63
ss#
Defendant.

The Defendant, MARIO KING, having entered a plea of guilty to the offense(s) of
Forgery, a Third-Degree Felony, and Attempted Unlawful Use of a Credit Card, a Class A
Misdemeanor, on June 2, 2003, and the Court having accepted said plea of guilty and the aboveentitled matter having been called on for sentencing on June 2, 2003, in Parowan, Utah, and the
above-named Defendant, MARIO KING, having appeared before the Court in person together
with his attorney of record, Dale Sessions, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney Troy A Little, and the Court having reviewed the sentencing
recommendation and having further reviewed the file in detail and thereafter having heard
statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Deputy Iron County Attorney, and the Court
being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, and

Commitment, to wit:
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant,
MARIO KING, has been convicted upon his plea of guilty to the offense of Forgery, a ThirdDegree Felony, and Attempted Unlawful Use of a Credit Card, a Class A Misdemeanor, and the
Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to why judgment should
not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court,
it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, MARIO KING, and pursuant to his
conviction of Forgery, a Third-Degree Felony, and Attempted Unlawful Use of a Credit Card, a
Class A Misdemeanor, is hereby sentenced to a term of zero to five (0-5) years in the Utah State
Prison. The statutory fine is suspended. Restitution in the amount of two thousand three hundred
dollars ($2,300) shall be paid under the supervision of Utah Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
COMMITMENT
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, MARIO KING, and deliver
him to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and confined in accordance with

the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment.
DATED this /O ^ d a y of June, 2003.
BY THE COURT:

^Philip Eves
)istrict Court Judge

CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss.
COUNTY OF IRON )
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron
County, State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the
original Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. MARIO
KING, Criminal No. 021501005, now on file and of record in my office.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of
Utah, this

\ 3 day of June, 2003.

CAROLYN BULLOCH
CAROLYN BULLOCH
District Court Clerk
( SEAL

)

ljid(iLr\^n^v

By:.
Deputy District Court Clerk
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c
UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 38a. CRIME VICTIMS RESTITUTION ACT
PART 3. RESTITUTION REQUIREMENTS
77-38a-302 Restitution criteria.

(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in
this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make
restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim
has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(13) and in determining whether
restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as
provided in Subsections (2) through (5).

(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and
court-ordered restitution.

(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim
for all losses caused by the defendant.

(b) "Court-ordered
restitution" means the restitution the court having
criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal
sentence at the time of sentencing.

(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as
provided in Subsection (5).

(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under
this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court
record.

(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the
restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full
hearing on the issue.

(5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense
Copr.

@
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UT ST § 77-38a-302
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-302
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shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing
court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an
offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of
criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's
criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.

(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including:

complete

(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or
loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;

(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and
devices relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical
care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing
recognized by the law of the place of treatment;

(iii) the cost
rehabilitation;

of

necessary

physical

and

occupational

(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim;

of

the

therapy

offense

if

and

the

(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are
lost due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that
were owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current
employment at the time of the offense; and

(vi) the cost of necessary funeral
resulted in the death of a victim.

and

related

services

if

the

offense

(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5) (a)
and (b) and:

(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment
of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the
defendant;

(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;

on

Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the
restitution and the method of payment; and

(iv) other circumstances
inappropriate.

which

the court

defendant

determines

of

the

may make

payment

of

restitution

(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of
restitution if the court determines that the complication and prolongation of
the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of restitution
under this Subsection
(5), substantially outweighs the need to provide
restitution to the victim.

History: C. 1953, 77-38a-302, enacted by L. 2001, ch. 137, § 8; 2002, ch. 35, §
13; 2002, Ch. 185, § 51; 2003, ch. 285, § 1.

<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables>

NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS

Amendment Notes. --The 2 002 amendment by ch. 35, effective May 6, 2 002, in
Subsection (1) substituted "chapter" for "subsection" and "Subsection 77-38a102(13)" for "Subsection 77-38a-102 (12) . "
The 2002 amendment by ch. 185, effective May 6, 2002, updated a statutory
reference in Subsection (1) and made a stylistic change.
This section has been reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, added Subsection (5)(b)(v) and
designated former Subsection (5)(b)(v) as (5)(b)(vi).

Effective Dates. --Laws 2001, ch. 137 became effective on April 30, 2001, pursuant
to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-302, UT ST § 77-38a-302

Statutes current through 2003 2nd Special Session. Annotations current through
Copr. ® West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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UT 51 (11/14/2003), 2003 Utah APP 389 (11/14/2003 and November 14, 2003
(Federal Cases)

Copyright ® 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the

of the LexisNexis Group

All rights reserved
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of the foregoing to be served via mailing by US Mail first class postage prepaid to:
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J. Frederic Voros, Jr.
Assistant Attorneys General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854

